La prochaine séance des séminaires Hotelling et Territoires et Mondialisation, se déroulera le jeudi 6 février 2014 de 16h à 17h30, à Sceaux (Salle Gaudemet). Nous aurons le plaisir de recevoir Antoine Bouet (Université Bordeaux IV) , qui présentera : “Informational Asymmetries as a Motive for Trade, Trade Policies, and, Inefficient Trade Agreements”
Abstract :
We consider a general equilibrium model of international trade with two symmetric countries, two commodities and a terms-of-trade externality to which we append a two-layer informational problem. Informational asymmetries matter for the design of trade policies and trade agreements both within one country as the result of political pressure by domestic producers but also at the international level. In the country that suffers from an internal informational problem, the government implements tariff barriers and “behind-the border” policies to protect national producers who have private information on their technology. At the international level, this government bargains with its trading partner over a trade agreement so as to increase worldwide welfare but retains private information on the exact political influence of domestic producers. That domestic firms have private information distorts production and the pattern of comparative advantages so that the information-sensitive good is now imported even if countries are otherwise symmetric. As a result, the domestic government now designs tariff barriers that depend on the political weight of inefficient producers in its objective function. This parameter is private information and it may be manipulated by the domestic government to reach a higher welfare gain in trade negotiations with the uninformed trading partner. We characterize the optimal packages of trade and “behind-the border” policies that might come out of such negotiation. We discuss the feasibility of free-trade in an environment so informationally-constrained and characterize second-best agreements that emerges from this double-edged incentive problem.”
Lieu du Séminaire:
Université Paris Sud – Faculté Jean Monnet
Salle Jean Gaudemet Bâtiment D – 1er étage
54, Boulevard Desgranges , Sceaux
RER B Station Robinson
Le programme du séminaire pour l’année 2013-2014 et le plan d’accès à la Faculté Jean Monnet sont disponibles ici.
Les organisateurs
Nathalie Etchart-Vincent
José de Sousa
Thomas Vendryes